The Long-Term Care Insurance Market

Philippe TRAINAR * Professeur, Cnam (Conservatoire national des arts et métiers) ; directeur, Fondation Scor pour la Science. Contact : ptrainar-external@scor.com.Pour des raisons de volume, ce papier a été raccourci par la REF qui assume seule la responsabilité de ces modifications. Le texte intégral est disponible auprès de l'auteur.

This article aims to draw lessons from economic analysis in order to assess the possibilities of covering the long-term care risk through insurance. It starts by noting the fundamental ambiguity of this risk. As a result, contracts aimed at hedging this risk exhibit a fundamental asymmetry, which is a source of moral hazard. In addition to the intrinsic limits of existing solutions, these features determine the conditions for optimal risk coverage, in particular by insurance companies, as well as the conditions whereby this could help strengthen competition among nursing care facilities. and improve the quality of the choices available.